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Abstract
This paper analyzes job referral effects that are based on residential location.
We use geo-referenced record data for the entire working population (liable to
social security) and the corresponding establishments in the Rhine-Ruhr met-
ropolitan area, which is Germany’s largest metropolitan area. We estimate
the propensity of two persons to work at the same place when residing in the
same neighborhood (reported with an accuracy of 500m×500m grid cells), and
compare the effect to people living in adjacent neighborhoods. We find a sig-
nificant increase in the probability of working together when living in the same
neighborhood, which is stable across various specifications. We differentiate
these referral effects for socioeconomic groups and find especially strong effects
for migrant groups from former guest-worker countries and new EU countries.
Further, we are able to investigate a number of issues in order to deepen the
insight on actual job referrals: distinguishing between the effects on working
in the same neighborhood and working in the same establishment – probably
the more accurate measure for job referrals – shows that the latter yield larger
relative effects. Besides, we find that clusters in employment although having a
significant positive effect play only a minor role for the magnitude of the referral
effect. We find evidence that informal job markets play the biggest role in small
firms and are least important in large firms. When we exclude short distance
commuters, we find the same probabilities of working together, which reinforces
our interpretation of this probability as a network effect.
Keywords: Job referrals, Labor market, Neighborhood effects, Network
effects, Social interactions
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1. Introduction
In social sciences the interest of interactions between individuals has in-
creased: how do people influence one another and how can we measure this
interaction? In labor economics, the importance of social interactions for the
determination of labor market outcomes has drawn attention in the last years.
One aspect of social interactions is interaction on a very local level: how does
sharing a residential neighborhood (and therefore facing the same institutions
and infrastructure) affect labor market outcomes? The channels hereby can be
diverse including e.g. spatial mismatch (Kain, 1968), discrimination, differences
in access to resources (such as education, Be´nabou (1994)) or differences in at-
titudes and role models across neighborhoods (Jencks and Mayer, 1990). In
this paper, we look at how residential neighborhoods can serve as a pool of in-
formation for an informal labor market and investigate the effect of job referrals
through one’s residential location.
In particular, we analyze the relationship between living and working together
in the context of job referrals in the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan area. The Rhine-
Ruhr is Germany’s largest and the EU’s second largest agglomeration, located
in North Rhine-Westphalia. It is spread across 7,110 km2 including big cities
like Cologne, Du¨sseldorf and Dortmund. The metropolitan area is home to over
11 million inhabitants and is especially interesting for urban analysis due to its
densely populated nature and the economic diversity.1
Our empirical framework is possible due to a novel data set covering geo-coded
record data for the entire working population (liable to social security) and the
corresponding establishments. As social interaction is not measurable directly
with any kind of administrative data, we use a well-established approach to ap-
proximate a local network effect: We estimate the propensity of two individuals
to work at the same place when residing in the same neighborhood (reported
with an accuracy of 500m×500m grid cells) with a linear probability model
(LPM), and compare it to the propensity of two individuals residing in adjacent
neighborhoods, conditional on a super-neighborhood fixed effect (where super-
neighborhoods are all adjacent neighborhood grid cells). The empirical design
follows Bayer et al. (2008).2 We find very similar effects: Bayer et al. (2008)
estimate that sharing the same immediate neighborhood raises the propensity
1Traditionally, the Rhine-Ruhr was specialized in heavy industry and mining. The struc-
tural change in the 1960s lead to a specialization in the service sector. Until today, the area
is economically contrasting with high unemployment rates in Dortmund and Gelsenkirchen
on the one hand and the prospering Rhine area on the other hand. See figure A.3 in the
Appendix.
2Bayer et al. (2008) use Census data for the Boston metropolitan area, which has 4.5
million inhabitants and is spread over 12,105 km2.
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to work together by 0.12 percentage points, whereas the effect is 0.14 percentage
points in our case. This translates into a relative increase in the probability of
working in the same neighborhood of 8%. When analyzing the effect of working
in the same firm we even find an increase in probability of about 30%.
We rule out several alternative explanations for this propensity effect,in partic-
ular a reverse direction of housing referrals amongst colleagues and the spurious
arising of correlation due to the geography of workplaces and transportation
infrastructure, by conducting a number of robustness checks. This makes us
confident to interpret this effect as an indication for a job referral where inform-
ation on an informal job market is circulated in one’s residential neighborhood.
To examine how different groups of workers make use of informal networks, we
differentiate job referral effects by characteristics such as education, industry,
nationality or age groups. The effects differ especially by ethnicity: compared to
Germans, the propensity to work together when sharing the same neighborhood
is highly increased, in particular for immigrants from new EU countries but also
from the former guest-worker countries Spain and Italy.
To this point, we cannot say anything about who (within a pair) benefits from
this local effect on one’s information set but focus on identifying the exist-
ence and credibility of a residential referral effect. Our network effect clearly is
an approximation for network activity and as presumably other forms of net-
works exist in an informal job market. The literature distinguishes three types
of informal job market networks: networks of former colleagues or classmates
(see e.g. Glitz (2013), Dustmann et al. (2011), Kramarz and Nordstro¨m Skans
(2013), Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) and Saygin et al. (2014)), family net-
works (see e.g. Kramarz and Nordstro¨m Skans (2013)), and residence based net-
works (see e.g. Bayer et al. (2008), Schmutte (2014), Hellerstein et al. (2011)).
We show that residence based networks play an important role, especially for
low skilled and minority workers. Moreover, the effect of residence based net-
works can have important implications for spatially based policies: if networks
for an informal job market exist in residential locations, they can potentially be
used for unemployment policies and generate local spill overs.
The goal of this paper is first to look at how referral effects based on resid-
ential location may differ for a European country as opposed to US American
data, given that institutional backgrounds and cultural conventions are quite
different with respect to the labor market and job search. In addition, we are
able to investigate a number of issues in order to shed further light on actual
job referral effects: First, our data allows us to distinguish between the effects
on working in the same neighborhood and working in the same establishment -
probably the more accurate measure for job referrals. Second, an advantage of
the data set we use is the overlapping structure of our reference groups, the so-
3
called super-neighborhoods. A crucial assumption for the identification of social
interaction is that there is no sorting by unobservables within these reference
groups. When conditioning on a fixed reference group as in Bayer et al. (2008)
or Schmutte (2014), this assumption is less likely to hold as when using a rolling
window design. Third, we analyze to what extent the findings are due to highly
concentrated clusters of employment opportunities in central business districts,
and find small positive bias in the referral to a neighborhood. Finally, we ad-
dress to what extent people tend to work in their residential neighborhood, and
whether the evidence in the literature is affected by inadequately accounting
for short-distance commuting behavior. In contrast to previous work, we also
incorporate data on commuting networks and find them not to be the driver of
our measured interaction effect.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
on the related literature. Section 3 describes the data set we use for the Ger-
man Rhine-Ruhr area. Section 4 presents the research design and the baseline
model. In section 5 we discuss our results as well as robustness checks and
further specifications. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature Review
In this paper, we focus on social interactions in the form of network effects
on an informal job market. As Montgomery (1991) points out, there is asym-
metric information on the labor market. Employers cannot observe applicants’
true productivity, such that they have an incentive to rely on referrals from their
own employees to reduce search costs and avoid adverse selection. Additionally,
Topa (2001) shows that workers have an incentive to share information on avail-
able jobs with their network while being employed, as this information sharing
serves as an insurance for the state of unemployment. Hence, in equilibrium one
should observe assortative matching of employees with their social networks. ?
suggest, that one natural form of such a network for information exchange is the
physically proximate space surrounding individuals, such as residential neigh-
borhoods. Neighborhoods qualify as information transmission environments,
because of the low transportation costs within neighborhoods (both monetary
and time costs) and because of local institutions, where people can meet and
interact, such as schools, churches or clubs. The work most related to ours is
Bayer et al. (2008), who also estimate the propensity of working together, when
living in the same as opposed to a nearby neighborhood. They use the 1990
U.S. Census of Population for the Boston metropolitan area and define census
blocks as neighborhoods and census block groups as super-neighborhoods. We
choose this paper as a point of departure, as the authors make a strong case
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for identifying social interaction in a very specific way, given the assumption
of no correlation in unobservables within super-neighborhoods. In contrast to
Bayer et al. (2008), our data provides information on the exact establishments
of workers. This specification reflects a referral effect much more realistically.
First, because theory as in Montgomery (1991) suggests that employers have
an incentive to hire workers’ social contacts, which is why we would expect to
observe workers from the same network at a firm level. Second, it is more likely
that workers gather information on job openings in their own establishment
rather than in the firm’s neighborhood.
Numerous other papers emphasize the importance of informal job markets like
Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) and Corcoran et al. (1980) using US data.
Glitz (2013) and Dustmann et al. (2011) investigate the effects of coworker net-
works on labor market outcomes using German and Saygin et al. (2014) using
Austrian record data. Glitz (2013) finds strong positive effects on own probab-
ility of working and wages, which indicates significant effects of social networks
in the German labor force on labor market outcomes.
Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) summarize stylized facts on the usage of
informal job search channels. About 15% of unemployed Americans use friends
and acquaintances for job search.3 They report variation in the usage of such
information channels among age and socioeconomic groups: e.g. woman and
individuals with better education use friends and family less often whereas the
findings for older people are opposing.4 Kramarz and Nordstro¨m Skans (2013)
analyze how networks of families affect labor market outcomes. Following Gran-
ovetter (1973), they distinguish between how strong ties, namely family and
weak ties like classmates and neighbors affect the decisions of youths in Sweden5
who enter the labor market. They find that the effect of strong ties is important,
but only significant if one parent is currently employed at the same plant. The
effect is stronger for low educated youths, those with bad grades or bad training
and for immigrants.
Pellizziari (2010) shows6 that about 30% of Germans use personal contacts for
finding a job whereas only about 15% of US Americans use such search chan-
3Using the PSID 1993, Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) find that 15.5 percent of
unemployed and 8.5 percent of employed ask friends and relatives about potential job openings.
4Ports (1993) find increased usage of informal channels for 45-55 year-olds and 55-65 year-
olds in 1992 respectively analyzing CPS data. On the contrary, e.g. Corcoran et al. (1980)
report that usage of informal job market declines with age and/or work experience. Holzer
(1987) finds that especially young people aged 16 to 23 rely on friends and relatives in 60-70%
of all jobs they actually attained (using data on search methods from the 1981 NLSY).
5They analyze this question using a population wide data set linking graduation records
and family ties to longitudinal matched employer-employee data with information on the firms.
6The author uses the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) from 1994-2001 and
the NLSY from 1979-2000
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nels. This suggests that job referrals might play an even more important role
in European countries as compared to in the US7.
Hellerstein et al. (2011) test for the presence and importance of residential net-
works (defined by census tracts) to determine the assignment of workers to
establishments. They use a measure of workplace segregation by residential ori-
gin and compare this to the share of co-workers that would come from the same
neighborhood if workplaces were randomly assigned. They find a significant
role of residence based networks using US 2000 Decennial Employer-Employee
Database (DEED), which is especially strong for unskilled workers, minorities
and workers in small establishments. Using a similar method and the same data,
Hellerstein et al. (2014) investigate the outcome of residence-based labor market
networks. They find a positive earnings effects and a lower turnover for workers
more connected to their neighbors, especially if neighbors have the same race and
hence interpret their results as evidence for productivity enhancing spillovers.
Schmutte (2014) also studies the effects of residence based networks on labor
market outcomes like earnings. Identifying local interaction with the design of
Bayer et al. (2008) as a first stage, he uses LEHD US employer-employee data
to estimate an employer-specific wage premium. He finds that workers living in
a neighborhood with high-quality networks are more likely to move to a better
paying job. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in network quality
is associated with a 25% increase in firm-specific wage premium on job change.
Overall, the evidence suggests that referral effects may differ between socioeco-
nomic characteristics, which is why we will differentiate between industries, age
groups, nationality and education categories.
3. Data
In this study we employ register data which are collected in the administrat-
ive processes of the German Federal Employment Agency (FEA, Bundesagentur
fu¨r Arbeit) and maintained in the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of
the Institute of Employment Research (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufs-
forschung, IAB). The IEB cover all employed persons who pay statutory social
security contributions, all recipients of benefits from unemployment security
(according to Social Code III) or from basic life support (according to Social
Code II), all participants in active labor market policy, as well as all persons
who approach FEA for job-search support. Due to the parallel nature of the
various data bases stemming from different processes, multiple spells may coex-
ist for each person at the same time (e.g. because a person searches for a new
7The difference in data sources limits the exact comparability of these numbers.
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job while being employed). If existing, the employment spell with the highest
salary is defined as the main spell.
To ease computation we use data only for the Rhine-Ruhr region, Germany’s
largest metropolitan area. It is a very densely populated area reflecting sev-
eral aspects that also represent the whole of Germany. The area is diverse in its
wealth and socioeconomic structure. It includes on the one hand prospering uni-
versity cities like Bonn and on the other hand former heavy industry and mining
centers, which have a high population of immigrants and also a high proportion
of unemployment like Gelsenkirchen. The IAB Research Data Centre geo-coded
both the work-place and the residential address corresponding to each person’s
main spell at June 30th 2008 (see Scholz et al. (2012)). Each person is assigned
to a quadratic grid cell of 500m length to warrant anonymity compulsory in
social security data provision. We use these grid cells as our basic definition of
a neighborhood.
u
C
u
D
u
A
uB
Figure 1: Defining neighborhood by a regular grid
Figure 1 shows the structure of the neighborhood definition: According to
the exact address, every individual is assigned to a grid cell (the small squares
correspond to 500m×500m grid cells). Individuals A and B are immediate neigh-
bors here, whereas C shares what we will further on call “super-neighborhood”
with A and B. D lives within a super-neighborhood of C but not with A and B.
In contrast to Bayer et al. (2008) who use predefined census blocks (neighbor-
hoods) which belong to a fixed census block group (super-neighborhood), every
grid cell (neighborhood) in our design is the centroid of a super-neighborhood
and thus every grid cell belongs to several super-neighborhoods. Although the
classification of neighborhoods and super-neighborhoods does not depend on
geographic factors such as big roads or rivers, the flexible design guarantees an
assignment for each grid cell to be the centroid of a super-neighborhood as well
as part of the surrounding for all neighboring grid cells. We believe that this
overlapping sampling scheme is an advantage as measured interaction is still
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very local but the conditioning surrounding is flexible.8 It may frequently hap-
pen that a person resides close to the outside border of the super-neighborhood
when using a fixed definition as in Bayer et al. (2008). This can lead to scenarios,
where the adjacent reference group or super-neighborhood would be closer to a
person than the actual reference group the estimation strategy is conditioning
on9 We use super-neighborhood fixed effects to deal with sorting on the basis
of unobservables. As every grid cell belongs to 9 different super-neighborhoods,
the influence of the remaining sorting within super-neighborhoods should be
reduced substantially. Besides, using a neighborhood definition that is based
on real distances rather than the number of people sharing a neighborhood (as
it is the case for census blocks and census block groups) makes accounting for
distances to workplaces and reflecting commuting behavior more realistic.
Within the geocoded IEB for Rhine-Ruhr, we observe roughly 4 million per-
sons, dispersed across 21,509 grid cells, who are aged 15-65 and participate in
the labor force (without self-employed, civil servants and members of the armed
forces). Of these persons, roughly 3.5 million persons are employees. To get a
file with individual data that is feasible for computation, we draw a 2% ran-
dom sample from all employed persons and will further denote these individuals
as i. They are combined with all persons residing within their own neighbor-
hood or in one of the eight contiguous neighborhoods; we denote all possible
neighbors as j and will further analyze pairs ij, who reside in the same super-
neighborhood. Compared to working with (possibly larger) samples for both
individuals and neighbors, the one-sided sampling has the advantage to enable
conclusions on job referrals in the population more easily (with one-dimensional
sampling probabilities, respectively univariate rather than bivariate cumulated
densities). All in all, we observe approximately 3.4 million persons living in one
of the super-neighborhoods. Figure A.4 in the appendix shows the distribution
of neighborhood and super-neighborhood sizes. The mass of the neighborhood-
size distribution lies in the range between 150 and 700 persons per grid cell; the
average neighborhood size is around 320. However, the average pair is observed
in a neighborhood with more than 900 inhabitants because larger neighborhoods
have a higher probability to be represented in the sample, and a person in a
large neighborhood has more neighbors.
The geographic scale in the IEB data set differs from that in the role model
paper. While Bayer et al. (2008) use census blocks (which on average measure
8This kind of mutually non-exclusive rolling-window delineation of super-neighborhoods is
also a method of identifying neighborhood effects (Bramoulle´ et al., 2009).
9If we would consider only the lower block of grid cells in figure 1 as a fixed reference group,
e.g. individual B would have D in its reference group, but none in the adjacent grid cells on
its right or above.
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Legend
Municipalities
Employment per grid cell
20 - 118
119 - 245
246 - 387
388 - 552
553 - 794
795 - 1235
1236 - 22560 10 20 305 Kilometers
Figure 2: Employees in 500×500m grid cells in the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan area
160m of length) as a definition for neighborhoods, our neighborhoods are consid-
erably larger measuring 500m×500m. Nevertheless, we believe that this extent
is small enough to guarantee the possibility of individuals actually interacting
with each other. For example the edge length of a grid cell corresponds to the
standard distance between bus stops for medium and highly populated urban
areas (see Ko¨hler and Bertocchi, 2010). It approximates a walking distance of
five minutes. Social interaction in a residential neighborhood can occur through
meeting at points such as sport clubs, churches or elementary schools10.
To illustrate the neighborhood sizes and the geographic extent of the data set,
10The whole Rhine-Ruhr area compasses 1,774 elementary schools, which differ in their
dispersion: on the basis of municipalities (German “Kreise” and “kreisfreie Sta¨dte”), there
is one elementary school per 2,522 inhabitants and a maximum 7,840 inhabitants per
elementary school (data from the ministry of education in North Rhine-Westphalia at
www.schulministerium.nrw.de). 2,522 inhabitants correspond to less than 1,100 employ-
ees when using the ratio of 35.9 Mio employees over 82 Mio inhabitants in Germany 2008
as an approximation. If we believe that e.g. parents meet when picking up their children
and possibly form social contacts there, the extent of the draw area is larger than that of a
residential neighborhood in our definition but smaller than a super-neighborhood.
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figure 2 shows the dispersion of individuals in our sample in the Rhein-Ruhr
area. Each dot represents a 500×500m grid cell and corresponds to our defini-
tion of a residential neighborhood. As figure 2 shows, the whole area is mostly
densely populated. A comparison to figure A.3 in the appendix shows, that the
most densely populated grid cells (the red areas) coincide with the area around
Cologne in the South, Du¨sseldorf in the West and Dortmund in the East.
In table 1 we compare groups in the population, in the sample, and in the neigh-
borhoods and super-neighborhoods of the sampled persons. As table 1 shows,
the 2% sample is almost identical to the population with respect to observable
characteristics. The groups considered here correspond to the covariates in our
estimations. The countries and groups of countries are the largest immigrant
groups and those who traditionally came to Germany as guest-workers (south-
ern European countries). Therefore we expect those groups to have formed
particularly strong networks within Germany.
Table 1: Group sizes in population and sample
Group Population Sample Neighbors Super-neighbors
Male 0.5181 .5168 .5182 .5180
Age 15-24 0.0985 .0991 .0993 .0993
Age 25-34 0.2000 .2001 .2053 .2023
Age 35-54 0.5392 .5405 .5417 .5439
Age 55-65 0.1531 .1515 .1536 .1545
Unskilled 0.1485 .1477 .1509 .1493
Med. skilled 0.4750 .4780 .4722 .4752
Highskilled 0.0963 .0932 .0960 .0967
German 0.9032 .9018 .8992 .9023
Greek 0.0051 .0052 .0053 .0051
Italian 0.0086 .0083 .0089 .0086
Spanish 0.0019 .0021 .0020 .0020
Turkish 0.0352 .0355 .0372 .0357
Yugoslaviana 0.0104 .0105 .0108 .0104
From new EUa 0.0068 .0070 .0067 .0068
Other nationality 0.0288 .0296 .0298 .0290
Primary sector 0.0395 .0405 .0388 .0394
Manufacturing 0.1763 .1779 .1754 .1764
Construction 0.0458 .0455 .0455 .0457
TTCb 0.2622 .2643 .2630 .2620
Business Services 0.1757 .1746 .1765 .1758
Other Services 0.3005 .2972 .3007 .3008
# employees 3,459,941 68,947 3,169,180 3,397,929
a: Yugoslavian covers immigrants from the territory of former Yugoslavia (in-
cluding Slovenia and Croatia); these are not included in the group of immigrants
from new EU members (which come from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Malta and Cyprus).
b: Trade, Transportation and Communication (TTC).
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4. Empirical Design
Our goal is to compare the propensity of individuals working together for
those living in the same neighborhood with individuals living close by. Our
empirical design allows to identify a social interaction effect based on within
super-neighborhood variation. The baseline model can be summarized as fol-
lows:
W aij = ρs + α0Rnij + εij with a = {n, f} (1)
i and j denote individuals living in the same super-neighborhood (block of 9
grid cells, see figure 1) and W aij is an indicator for both individuals sharing the
same work place. W aij takes on the values 0 or 100 so that parameters in the
LPM directly represent changes in percentage points. We differentiate W aij over
a = {n, f}: first, we follow Bayer et al. (2008) and define the same work place
as the neighborhood n where an individual works.11 Second, we use exact in-
formation on the establishments, where W fij = 100 if a pair of individuals works
at the exact same firm. All specifications are estimated with heteroscedasticity
and cluster robust standard errors12. Rnij is equal to 1 if both i and j live in
the same grid cell and zero otherwise. Therefore we can interpret α0, the social
interaction effect, as the increase in probability of working together when shar-
ing a neighborhood. ρs denotes a fixed effect for the super-neighborhood. It
deals with sorting into residential location which leads to selection bias due to
correlation in unobservable factors in neighborhoods (such as amenities or the
access to public transportation), an important issue in the neighborhood effects
literature. α0 can be identified as the social interaction effect given that the two
key assumptions are fulfilled: First, social interaction within a neighborhood is
a local phenomenon. Second, individuals are able to choose their residential loc-
ation freely across super-neighborhoods but are randomly located within, such
that there is no correlation in unobservable characteristics affecting both work
place and residential location within a super-neighborhood.
To meet the requirement of the latter assumption, Bayer et al. (2008) argue that
on a very local level, the housing market is comparably thin. When individu-
als are choosing their residential location, it may be hard to observe variation
within super-neighborhoods, whereas it is easier to see this variation between
11A workplace area has size 1km×1km as to allow for more manufacturing establishments
(which occupy more space than most services) to be in the same area.
12Following Angrist and Pischke (2009), including robust standard errors deals with most of
the problems when applying an LPM. Additional to the more straight forward interpretation
of LPM estimating e.g. a Probit model would make computation more difficult given the
extent of the data set.
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the larger super-neighborhoods. Furthermore, as with 500m length a neighbor-
hood is considerably small, such that it is not necessarily the case that one can
find a suitable dwelling given an appropriate search period in an exact small
neighborhood, but rather has to look for something in a more spacious area
(such as the super-neighborhood). Germans in general are less mobile com-
pared to US Americans: 16% of Germans have changed their residence within
the last two years and only 9% moved within a city (Bo¨ltken et al., 2013)13,
which gives rise to the assumption that the thinness of the housing market is
plausible even within cities. Besides, the overlapping structure of our super-
neighborhood design should additionally contribute to meet this criterion: even
if there is sorting within super-neighborhoods, sampling each small grid cell up
to 9 times should substantially reduce the remaining sorting. This is a clear
advantage as compared to Bayer et al. (2008) and Schmutte (2014), who use
predefined fixed census block groups as a reference group.
To account for differences in the usage of informal networks between socioeco-
nomic groups, we include individual characteristics.
W aij = ρs + β′(Xi − X¯) + (α0 + α′1(Xi − X¯))Rnij + εij with a = {n, f} (2)
Here we can investigate how belonging to a certain group adds to the propensity
of working together. α1 depicts the effect of being part of a particular group and
working together - a “one-sided” social interaction effect. To interpret the effect
of sharing a neighborhood at the mean of the categorical variables X, we center
all covariates around zero.14 We use categorical variables for personal character-
istics such as sex, age groups15, skill groups16, categories of nationality, different
industries, and a control for the size of the neighborhood. β can be interpreted
as the baseline propensity of residing in the same super-neighborhood (belong-
ing to the same reference group) but not sharing an immediate neighborhood
13Bayer et al. (2008) argue, that only 11 percent of the owner occupants in their census
sample had changed owners. As the data we use is registry data, we cannot observe how
people live and have to rely on additional data for motivational reasons. In Germany, the
owner occupancy rate is considerably smaller - about 50% (Bo¨ltken et al., 2013) - as compared
to the US where the rate is about 70% (Ihrke and Faber, 2012). Both in Germany and the US,
owner-occupants are less mobile: in the German data, only 6.3% moved in the last two years
and only 3.6% moved within a city. As moving rates for Germans are comparably smaller
anyway, we believe that the argumentation of Bayer et al. (2008) holds for our data set, too.
14Wooldridge (2002) argues that subtracting the sample mean from each component allows
identification of α0 as the average treatment effect of Rij on the dependent variable.
15Young adults from 15-24, career entrants aged 25-34, those established in the work force
from 35-54 and senior workers between 55 and 65 years.
16Low skilled refers to lower secondary education with and without apprenticeship. Medium
skilled individuals have higher secondary education (German “Abitur”), with and without
apprenticeship. The high skilled group refers to individuals with a university degree.
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on working together for different characteristic groups (Xi).
W aij = ρs + β′(Xij − X¯) + (α0 + α′1(Xij − X¯))Rnij + εij with a = {n, f} (3)
In equation 3, we examine whether the propensity of working together var-
ies with the characteristics of a pair (as opposed to the individual character-
istic measured by equation 2). Including this specification aims to investigate
whether e.g. more similar pairs are more likely to profit from social interaction
and whether certain groups have higher probabilities to work together, because
of a stronger attachment to the labor market. Both equation 2 and 3 can be
used to validate our estimates with evidence from the informal job market and
network literature presented in section 2.
5. Results
Table 2 summarizes the results from our baseline model as presented in sec-
tion 4. Estimating unconditionally (without super-neighborhood fixed effects)
gives an impressions on the baseline probability of working together17: when
residing in the same super-neighborhood the probability of working in the same
neighborhood is 1.8% and 0.22% for working in the same firm. Estimating equa-
tions 1-3 can then be interpreted as an increase in this baseline probability by
residing in the same neighborhood.
Column (1) corresponds to equation 1, where sharing a neighborhood is the
single explanatory variable. The social interaction effect is positive and highly
significant for both cases of a = (n, f), which means evidence for a positive im-
pact of sharing a residential neighborhood on the propensity to work together.
For a referral to a neighborhood (a = n), the probability of working together is
increased by 0.14 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase by 8%.
Despite the different definition of neighborhoods the magnitude of the social
interaction effect is similar compared to the 0.12 percentage points estimated
by Bayer et al. (2008).
Interpreting the referral to a firm can be seen as an even higher indication for
an actual job referral. The estimated absolute social interaction effect is some-
what smaller as compared to the referral to neighborhood effect, albeit still
positive and highly significant. The probability to work together at the same
firm increases by 0.07 percentage points if a pair of individuals lives in the same
neighborhood. This is equivalent to a 30% increase in probability compared to
the unconditional baseline probability which is much larger than in the case of a
17Here, we estimate Waij = α0 + α1Rnij + εij and interpret α0 as the baseline probability of
working together when sharing the same super-neighborhood.
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referral to a neighborhood. This means that the case of (a = f) not only reflects
an actual referral more realistically, but also is economically more meaningful.
Columns (2) and (3) refer to equation 2 and equation 3, where we are inter-
ested in how the social interaction effect reacts first for different socioeconomic
groups and second for pairs of socioeconomic groups. For expositional purpose,
we only report joint significance in this table; full outputs are presented in the
appendix. Noticeably, the social interaction effect α0 is relatively stable across
specifications. Column (2) shows the one-sided interaction effect. Here, only
some of the interactions are jointly significant: there is no statistically significant
differential effect of sharing a neighborhood varying by qualification, age group
or gender both for referrals to neighborhoods and to firms. An individual’s own
ethnicity18 and in which industry19 one works generate significant variation in
the referral effect. The larger a neighborhood i lives in, the smaller the referral
effect; this probably corresponds to the likelihood of interaction the more indi-
viduals reside in a neighborhood.
Column (3) describes how pairs of certain groups interact in residential neigh-
borhoods. The effect of Xij describes the propensity to work together when
sharing a super-neighborhood: as expected, we see higher propensities for young
and old pairs of workers, as well as unskilled pairs and matches for several in-
dustry sectors, but almost no effect of ethnic groups. Again the interaction
term determines the local referral effect. Apart from age groups, the impact of
all categories are jointly significant which indicates that grouping pairs with re-
spect to socioeconomic categories at least plays some role for job referrals. The
interaction effects (α1 in equation 3) can be interpreted as the additional effect
of being both in the same socioeconomic group and sharing the same neigh-
borhood. There are no big differences across gender and age groups (meaning
that the interaction effects are either small or insignificant). Consistent with
the literature on informal job markets, pairs of unskilled workers have a com-
paratively higher propensity to work together both at the same neighborhood
and at the same firm. For different ethnic groups the effect varies, too: espe-
cially for people from the new EU countries, the probability to work together
increases by over 20% as compared to Germans (the reference group) both for
referrals to neighborhoods and referrals to firms. Also Italians and people from
former Yugoslavia show stronger referral effects. In contrast, albeit being the
18The effect differs between referrals to neighborhoods, where Greeks have the most signi-
ficant increase in probability of working together, and referrals to neighborhoods, where Turks
seem to profit the most from referral effects. For all other groups, the effects are positive but
rather noisy.
19Compared to women working in manufacturing, working in all other industry sectors has
a negative effect on working together when sharing a neighborhood, with business related
services having the largest and most significant effect.
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biggest migrant group in Germany, Turkish do not seem to behave differently
than Germans, with the interaction effect being insignificant. For the different
types of industries20, the propensity to work together is increased in a similar
way across groups. The size of the residential neighborhood of pairs seems to
have no effect on working together; it has a significant negative effect on the
interaction (the referral), however. We interpret this as decreasing probability
to meet when living in a higher populated neighborhood, a result also stated by
Calvo`-Armengol and Zenou (2005)21.
We use a linear model for computational reasons. One concern on the specifica-
tion could be that estimating a linear model does not accurately reflect potential
non-linearities in the propensity of working together and therefore overstates the
true network effect. We therefore calculate linear predictions of Wˆij using equa-
tion 2 and 3. We find mean and median predicted probability to be close to
the baseline probability of working together in a super-neighborhood, which we
interpret as an indication for an LPM being a correct specification.
6. Robustness and Discussion
The baseline model presented above has three major issues for identifying
a causal social interaction effect: self selection, potential simultaneity bias, and
spurious correlation due to geography. In the following, we discuss strategies to
reduce these problems.
6.1. Sorting within super-neighborhoods
We want to make sure the key assumption for identification, no correlation in
unobservables affecting work location within a super-neighborhood, can be re-
garded as reasonable. Following Altonji et al. (2005), selectivity in observables
is proportional to selectivity in unobservables and can be seen as an indica-
tion of sorting by unobservable characteristics. Therefore, we first analyze the
sorting behavior with respect to observable characteristics. We compute cor-
relations of observable characteristics (age groups, gender, nationality groups,
skill groups and industry groups) E(Di 1ni ∑jDj) = E(Xij) for both pairs that
reside in a neighborhood together and for pairs who share a super-neighborhood
but are not immediate neighbors22, and test whether they differ between the
20An exception is the Primary Sector. Here the increase in propensity to work together
can probably be accounted for – at least to some extent – by disproportionately many people
living very close to their workplace.
21Calvo`-Armengol and Zenou (2005) show in a matching framework, that the probability of
finding a job increases with network size up to a critical value, where the job finding probability
decreases.
22The correlations are the expected value of observing two individuals i and j belonging to
the same group D. Therefore some of the correlations are very high just because the group
16
two groups. Table A.9 in the appendix presents correlations on the basis of
observables. We see no systematic differences, with the super-neighborhood
having slightly less correlations. This indicates sorting on the basis of observ-
ables but no difference in the patterns of sorting between neighborhoods and
super-neighborhoods. Apart from that, especially Turkish, people from former
Yugoslavia and the new EU countries sort themselves together into neighbor-
hoods. In contrast, immigrants from other southern European countries tend to
sort away from each other. This is remarkable considering the interpretation of
the interaction effects presented above: Turkish, who seem to sort themselves
together do not tend to be more likely to work together. In contrast, Italians and
Spanish who have an increased probability to work together tend to sort away
from each other23. This indicates that although we clearly see some sorting in
observables, it does not seem to bias our interaction estimates systematically.
Second we analyze whether there is sorting within super-neighborhoods with
respect to unobservables. The residuals from estimating equation 2 represent
everything which is unobservable with respect to the choice of residential and
working location and therefore proxy sorting on the basis of unobservables. By
construction, the residuals should have an average value of zero on the basis of
super-neighborhoods. Comparing the mean residuals for those pairs sharing a
neighborhood (i.e. Rij = 1) within each super-neighborhood with those sharing
a super-neighborhood but not its core (Rij = 0) gives a direct test for sorting on
the basis of unobservables. For the estimation of a referral to a neighborhood
in specification (1), the 1st percentile of the neighborhood-specific averages is
-1.11 and the 99th percentile is 2.33, for referrals to a firm None of these values
is far away from zero, as compared to the variation of the fixed effects (see table
2). If we control for covariates in specifications 2 and 3, these averages become
even closer to zero. Therefore, we conclude that there is no sorting on the basis
of unobservables affecting both workplace and residential location within super-
neighborhoods. This means that our empirical design deals successfully with
self selection of residential location, the most important issue in identification
of neighborhood effects.
6.2. Reverse Causality
Another important issue is to eliminate the possibility of reverse causality,
meaning that the estimated effects are actually no job referrals but result from
is comparatively big, which is why the probability to be matched into a pair with your own
group is high.
23The very high positive effect for new EU migrants, however, seems to be inflated by
positive sorting bias. Nevertheless, as it is big and statistically highly significant, we believe
that there should still be some effect generate by referrals.
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individuals receiving referrals from coworkers for a place of residence. To check
which direction of the effect is the most plausible, we select four different sub-
samples and re-estimate equation 1, the results are presented in table 3. As
only the IEB cross section of 2008 is geo-coded, we have to rely on location in
form of zip codes two years prior to our main sample, in 2006. Zip codes refer
to districts within cities; hence the residential areas are larger than that of our
main specification but still represent movements within cities.
In a subsample of “residential stayers”, the estimate for a referral to a neigh-
borhood (a = n) rises slightly to 0.1552 percentage points and .0828 for referrals
to a firm. Also the constant rises which is associated with an overall increase
in probability, since restricting the sample to only residential stayers mainly
excludes pairs not working together. The relative increase24 is very similar for
both types of referrals being slightly smaller than in the baseline specification
with the whole sample.
Second we use a subset of “job movers”25: we select only pairs of which one
individual has changed the workplace (defined as the zip code where an indi-
vidual works). For both referrals to a neighborhood and to a firm the absolute
effect is very close to the one estimated with the whole sample whereas there is
an increase in the relative probability for a referral to a firm.
Third, we select individuals, who have all lived in the same zip code in the
last two years and use only pairs where one individual has changed the working
location, i.e. “residential stayers with a job move”. Whenever one individual
has changed working location and both individuals have stayed at their resid-
ence. Here, the absolute effect decreases slightly for both kinds of referrals but
remains statistically significant. It is worth noting that while there is a slight
decrease in the relative effect for referrals to a neighborhood, the relative effect
for firms increases to 49%. In this group job referrals are most likely, as one of
the pair is supposed to have been seeking a job in the previous two years. 26
The estimated absolute referral effects in the baseline specification and in this
restricted sample are not statistically different from each other (for both cases
of a = {n, f}), which makes us confident that the social interaction effect we
find is indeed a job referral effect.
Finally we select a subsample where it is most likely to observe a referral on
the housing market: we use pairs where one individual has lived in the zip code
24As we use different subsamples for this exercise, we use the constants for each estimation
as a baseline probability to calculate the relative increase here.
25This specification includes individuals who move to find a new job, but it should give us
a more precise feeling for the magnitude of the third effect.
26This subsample differs from the whole sample, which is why we should not suspect the
effect to be as big as that for the whole sample: this is in line with Bayer et al. (2008), who
find a social interaction effect of 0.09 percentage points for job movers.
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area for the last two years whereas the other has changed zip code area but
both individuals have worked in the same zip code area during that period,
i.e. there is one change in residential location but no change in employment for
both. This is a circumstance where it is most likely that the estimated social
interaction effect is actually induced by co-workers exchanging information on
the housing market. In this case, the absolute effect of Rij is increased and
highly significant both for a = n and a = f . Nevertheless the sample size is con-
siderably smaller than in all other cases and the sample seems to be inherently
different from those before: regarding the magnitude of the constant suggests,
that by selecting this specific subsample, we exclude primarily individuals not
working together (i.e. zeros for Wij), which could be a reason why the estim-
ated absolute interaction effect is bigger than in the estimation with the whole
sample. For referrals to a neighborhood, the baseline probability of working
together when sharing a super-neighborhood increases by 15% compared to the
estimation with the whole sample, for referrals to a firm it is even increased by
50%. Apart from this, the people in this subsample should differ from those in
the whole sample, as we explicitly select individuals with a stable employment.
The relative increase is larger in case of a referral to a neighborhood but with
29.89% for a referral to a firm considerably smaller, especially compared to the
case where a job market referral is most likely. When modelling an environ-
ment, where a job referral is most likely (residential stayers with a job move),
the magnitude and significance of the social interaction effect are very stable,
which means that we have also evidence for a referral effect where the job re-
ferral is most likely. Besides we want to emphasize on the specification of the
social interaction effect as a referral to a firm: not only does this interpretation
reflect theoretical considerations of a referral effect more closely (see Section 2),
but this specification also seems to be more stable and less susceptible to bias
than the case of a referral to a neighborhood.
6.3. Random Reassignment to Jobs
Is it possible that the correlation we observe is induced by something other
than referrals by neighbors? Workplaces are neither evenly nor randomly al-
located over space. They follow a certain structure because firms settle up
more frequently in the central business district, subcentral business districts, or
particular business zones (see e.g. Fujita et al. (1999) for an overview). As a
consequence, a certain correlation with regard to workplaces may arise because
people optimize their commuting distance. In order to disentangle this spuri-
ous correlation from the correlation due to job referrals, we randomly reassign a
workplace neighborhood to persons i according to the workplace probabilities in
their super-neighborhood. To do so, we determine for each super-neighborhood
20
Table 4: Baseline estimation for artificial workplaces
Variable W˜nij for a = n
Constant 1.8195∗∗∗
(.0016)
Rij .0278
∗∗∗
(.0104)
Relative increase [1.52%]
σu 2.1095
σε 13.2895
# pairs 155.7 Mio
# groups 11376
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. [ ]
gives increase in probability of working together. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark
significance at the 90%/95%/99% confidence level.
s the specific relative frequencies (i.e. the probabilities) for each workplace
neighborhood, pn∣s, with cumulated frequencies Fn∣s = ∫ ⋃m∈[1,...,n]pm∣s; the fre-
quencies add up to the unit interval as ∫ ⋃n∈[1,...,N]pn∣s = 1). Then we draw
for each person i from a uniform distribution. The realization of this draw
corresponds to a unique workplace n specific partition on the unit interval (as{ui ∈ (Fn−1∣s, Fn∣s]} ↦ n) which determines for each person i a counterfactual
workplace. Then we can construct a new variable for the hypothetical workplace
coincidence, W˜nij , and reestimate equation 1:
W˜nij = ρs + α0Rij + εij (4)
Table 4 shows, that the spurious correlation due to clusters in employment is
positive and statistically highly significant. Nevertheless, the magnitude of both
the absolute and relative effect is small compared to the baseline specification
in table 2. All in all, this indicates that what we measure as a referral effect
using the design of Bayer et al. (2008) (referral to a neighborhood), the effects
are probably a little bit too high and seem to be less robust to additional
specifications and checks.
6.4. Firm size effects
Another issue closely related is a potential firm size effect: Is it possible that
the effect of a high correlation of living together and working together is driven
by individuals working in large establishments? Or are referrals especially in
small firms more important, as information flows easier in small establishments
and employers in small firms are most likely to rely on informal job markets?
To get an idea whether the network effect we measure is actually only spurious
correlation generated by firm sizes or whether small firms are actually better
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Table 5: Firm size effects for referrals to a neighborhood
Variable Small firms Small f. males Medium firms Large firms
Constant 1.8344∗∗∗ 1.764∗∗∗ 1.4818∗∗∗ 2.0055∗∗∗
(.0018) (.0025) (.0016) (.0074)
Rij .1300
∗∗∗ .1062∗∗∗ .0756∗∗∗ .1490∗∗∗
(.0115) (.0160) (.0105) (.0477)
Relative increase [7.1%] [9.0%] [5.1%] [7.4%]
σu 3.3893 1.6823 3.4128 4.3674
σε 13.4182 10.7988 12.0897 13.9568
# pairs 74.2 Mio 18.1 Mio 47.3 Mio 59.8 Mio
# groups 10785 9343 10474 10535
Corr(u,Xb) -.0090 -.0052 -.0058 .0048
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. [ ] gives increase in probability
of working together ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark significance at the 90%/95%/99% confidence level.
Small firms: < 50 employees, medium: 50-249 employees, large: ≥250 employees.
transmitter of information, we estimate our baseline specification for three dif-
ferent subsets. First we re-estimate equation 1 for pairs of individuals of whom
the neighbors j are working in small or tiny firms (less than 50 employees). The
second category are medium sized firms, where j work in establishments with
50 to less than 250 employees. Third we look at a subset of neighbors who work
in large establishments, defined as those larger than 250 employees.
Again we differentiate between referrals to a neighborhood and to a firm. We
are especially concerned of biased results in the small size category, because here
we should have many family businesses, where people work and live together as
a result of belonging to one household. As we cannot identify members of one
household in our data set, we estimate the equation for small firms for males
only. For both specifications a the results do not differ significantly.
Table 5 shows the probability of working in the same neighborhood when j works
in different sizes of establishments. We observe no systematic difference by firm
size. Both absolute and relative increases in probability are fairly similar to our
baseline specification, with medium firms having the smallest effect. Working in
the same neighborhood with people from one’s super-neighborhood (constant)
is most likely for large firms, a small hint towards a size effect. Regarding the
relative effect, the magnitude is in line with our other specifications.
More interestingly we observe in table 6 huge increases in the relative prob-
ability of working in the same small firm, which are also highly significant.
Excluding females from the sample does not change this result, but leaves both
absolute and relative effect unchanged. When j is working in a medium size
establishment, the probability of working with a neighbor is comparable to that
in the whole sample, whereas the relative effect is smallest and least precisely
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Table 6: Firm size effects for referrals to a firm
Variable Small firms Small f. males Medium firms Large firms
Constant .0156∗∗∗ .01711∗∗∗ .0880∗∗∗ .5788∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0004) (.0013) (.0074)
Rij .0217
∗∗∗ .0233∗∗∗ .0418∗∗∗ .1275∗∗∗
(.0011) (.0023) (.0081) (.0472)
Relative increase [139.9%] [136.3%] [47.6%] [22.02%]
σu 1.7040 .5687 1.0772 4.3674
σε 1.3745 1.4367 3.0664 13.9568
# pairs 74.2 Mio 18.1 Mio 47.3 Mio 59.8 Mio
# groups 10785 9343 10474 10535
Corr(u,Xb) .0036 .0061 .0162 .0048
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. [ ] gives increase in probability
of working together. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark significance at the 90%/95%/99% confidence level.
Small firms: < 50 employees, medium: 50-249 employees, large: ≥250 employees.
estimated27 in case of large firms. Although we do not want to stress causal
interpretation here, as our subsets are selective, we see these results as a clear
indication that our estimates are not driven by a pure size effect meaning people
are only working with their neighbors because they all work in big firms. In
contrast, small establishments seem to be best suitable for referring someone
from your network, maybe because employers rely more heavily on informal re-
ferrals or because information flows easier in small plants. This result is also in
line with Hellerstein et al. (2011).
6.5. Commuting
To get further insight into the nature of the measured referral effects, we
explicitly address the effect of commuting behavior. We are concerned that our
measured effect could be driven by a disproportionately high number of short
distance commuters who locate close to their work place and hence have a high
probability of working with their neighbors. Therefore, we exclude all individu-
als working in the same zip code area as they live in and reestimate equation 1
with this restricted sample to test whether the coefficient of social interaction
α0 differs significantly from that in the full sample. Table 7 summarizes the
results for referrals to a neighborhood and referrals to a firm. The sample size
is restricted to 154.2 million pairs ij, which means that excluding all individuals
who live where they work does not reduce the data set fundamentally, but there
seems to be only a minority of individuals working at their residential location.
Furthermore, both the constant and the social interaction effect remain at a
27Albeit being significant on a 1% level, the 95% confidence interval of Rij goes from 0.0349
to 0.2201, which is large considering the sample size.
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Table 7: Baseline estimation excluding short distance commuters
Variable a = n a = f
Constant 1.9528∗∗∗ .2390∗∗∗
(.0040) (.0041)
Rij .1298
∗∗∗ .0787∗∗∗
(.0269) (.0262)
Relative increase [6.64%] [32.92%]
σu 4.9131 2.2322
σε 13.8424 4.9754
# pairs 154.2 Mio 154.2 Mio
# groups 11325 11325
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. [ ]
gives increase in probability of working together. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark
significance at the 90%/95%/99% confidence level.
comparable level. The baseline probability of working together when sharing
the same super-neighborhood (constant) is slightly higher both for referrals to
a neighborhood and referrals to a firm. The absolute effect of Rij in contrast is
slightly lower for a referral to a neighborhood, but still in a very similar range
with .13 versus .14 using the whole sample. For referrals to a firm, the effect is
even a bit higher as compared to the estimation with the whole sample (.0787
versus .0746). Over all, the results stay very much the same, which suggests
that short distance commuters are not the main drivers in the referral effect and
we do not observe a spurious correlation here.
Another issue related to commuting is the potential sorting of individuals close
to access to junctions of public transportation which likewise can lead to spuri-
ous correlation. We amend our data set by using georeferenced data of all
S-Bahn28 stations of the linked transport system Rhine-Ruhr29 (VRR), which
is a subsample of the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan area30. We further investigate
whether the probability of working together and living together is increased,
when people work close to access in public transportation. We look at whether
such “networks of commuters” increase the probability of working together when
sharing the same neighborhood. To check this, we estimate
W aij = ρs + β′(Sj − S¯) + (α0 + α′1(Sj − S¯))Rnij + εij with a = {n, f} (5)
28S-Bahn is a German commuter rail network that serves within city centers and suburbs
nearby big cities. The S-Bahn is usually faster and serves a larger area than the U-Bahn or
metro.
29Verkehrsverbund Rhine-Ruhr (VRR). See http://www.vrr.de/en/ for further informa-
tion.
30The VRR encompasses with the Ruhr region, the Niederrhein, Wuppertal, Remscheid,
Solingen and Du¨sseldorf the biggest part of the Rhine Ruhr area. Only the South (with
Cologne and Bonn) and the North East are not included in this public transportation network.
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where Sj = 1 if individual j works in a neighborhood that has an S-Bahn stop. A
positive value for β indicates an increase in the baseline probability of working
together at a workplace which is easier to access. The social interaction effect
α1 is interpretable as “network of commuters” effect, as it reflects the increase
in probability of working together when living in the same neighborhood if the
commuting destination has an S-Bahn stop31.
Table 8 shows the results of estimating equation 5. (1) indicates a subsample
where all i, j work in the VRR area, (2) are all restricts the full data set to all
i, j living in the VRR area and (3) uses the intersection of (1) and (2) where i, j
both work and live in the VRR area. As the sample sizes show using only the
VRR region still leaves us with a fairly large dataset.
When estimating the probability of working in the same neighborhood (a = n),
we find an increase in the baseline probability of working together in the same
neighborhood which has access to an S-Bahn station (Sj = 1). However, in the
case of referrals to a firm, the effect of Sj is statistically not different from zero
in any of the specifications.
The social interaction effect without access to a public transportation network
Rij is a bit smaller than in the baseline specification both for referrals to a
neighborhood and referrals to a firm, but still in a comparable range. What
is more interesting though is the interaction effect Sj ×Rij : the probability of
pairs to work in the same neighborhood which has an S-Bahn stop is negative.
This means, the existence of an S-Bahn stop actually reduces the probability of
working together with your neighbor, which is in contrast to the interpretation
of the “network of commuters”. Nevertheless we should interpret this result
with caution: although two out of three specifications are significant at a 1%
level, the measurement of the effects is imprecise with rather big confidence in-
tervals compared to other specifications. Estimating the probability of working
in the same establishment with access to public transportation and living in the
same neighborhood also yields negative signs, but none of the specifications are
statistically different from zero. Overall we can conclude that we can exclude
the role of commuting as a source of bias to our estimates of a residence based
referral effect and that – especially in our preferred specification with a = f –
we find very similar results when excluding short distance commuters and no
significant results when conditioning on access to public transportation.
31Controlling in the same fashion for S-Bahn stops at the place of residence is impossible as
the information on the presence of a station (within a super-neighborhood) will be absorbed
by the super-neighborhood fixed effect.
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7. Conclusion
Most of the empirical work on neighborhood and referral effects so far has
been on US American data; in contrast, we look at residence based referral ef-
fects for the Rhine-Ruhr area, one of the biggest agglomerations in Europe. We
use the research design proposed by Bayer et al. (2008) to compare propensities
to work together when sharing an immediate neighborhood while holding the
surrounding neighboring area constant. This allows us to identify a social in-
teraction effect using the within variation of the so-called super-neighborhoods.
The results of our baseline specification are very similar to those for the Bo-
ston metropolitan area: we significantly estimate the probability to work with
a neighbor to be 0.14 percentage points while Bayer et al. (2008) find the effect
to be 0.12 percentage points. So the first question whether the extent of referral
effects based on residential location differs for a European country as compared
to the US can be denied: although we use a different definition of neighbor-
hood and super-neighborhood, we find very similar results. As our estimates
are slightly higher, we can reject the hypothesis that Germans use residence
based networks for job information less intensively.
The novel geo-coded data allow us further to differentiate referral effects as a
“referral to firm” effect; the absolute effect is about 0.06 percentage points be-
low that for referrals to a neighborhood. However, the relative increase is with
over 30% as compared to 8% larger and hence economically more meaningful.
We interpret this referral to a firm as the more precise measure for job referrals,
as information on available jobs is restricted mostly to one’s own firm. Addi-
tionally, the effect seems to be even more stable across specifications. Hence,
we argue that the previous literature understates actual network effects.
The referral effects are even stronger for similar pairs especially of the same
nationality. This finding is in line with the literature of immigrantion and in-
tegration: for example Glitz (2012) shows substantial immigrant segregation
both in workplaces and in residential location in Germany, which varies for
groups of immigrants. Segregation in residential location seems to be independ-
ent of qualification, whereas segregation in workplaces is more present for low
qualified immigrants. Here, we can differentiate residential locations in much
more detail due to the geocoded data and we see that some ethnicities sort
themselves together (see table A.9) and also show an increased propensity to
work together. Nevertheless, segregation or integration are not the points of
main interest in this study but the result here can be seen as an interesting
starting point for future research.
Our estimates for referral effects are stable across several specifications such
that we can exclude several other explanations besides a job referral effect.
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We find that there is no sorting on the basis of unobservables within super-
neighborhoods, which means that including the fixed effects should deal with
the issue of self selection into residential location.
Although we cannot rule out completely the possibility of a bias in our estim-
ated referral effect due to simultaneity, we argue that it is very plausible that
what we observe accounts for an actual referral effect on the job market, as we
can show to find very similar results for a subset of individuals, for whom job
referrals are most likely.
To comment on the extent to which the estimated effects are a result of clusters
in employment and differences in accessibility, we reassign jobs randomly to
people, while leaving their location unchanged. We find positive and significant
spurious correlation due to the geographical distribution of workplaces. How-
ever, the greater portion can be attributed to an actual referral effect. The effect
of spurious correlation amounts to only 0.03 percentage points for a spurious
referral to a neighborhood, which means that even when subtracting this from
our estimated interaction effect, we still find a positive and significant referral
effect which is comparable in magnitude to what previous literature found.
Another concern is that we measure high probabilities of working with one’s
neighbor as a size effect: if everyone works in a big firm, the likelihood of work-
ing with a neighbor is automatically high. We can rule out this concern, as we
find the lowest increase in probability to work with a neighbor at the same large
establishment. In contrast, the relative effect is extremely high for referrals to a
small firm, which suggests that for small businesses informal job market chan-
nels are most important (which is in line with e.g. Hellerstein et al. (2011)).
Finally, we analyze the role of commuting on our referral effect. First, we
exclude all short distance commuters and show that the results do not change
substantially, which indicates that our estimates are not driven by short distance
commuters. Further we examine the effect of access to public transportation on
referrals. We find no evidence for “networks of commuters”.
The paper investigates the effect of living together on the probability of work-
ing together. We find strong evidence for a positive and highly significant re-
lationship, which is robust across several specifications and robustness tests,
addressing common issues on the identification of neighborhood effects.
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AppendixA. Appendix
Table A.9: Correlation between individual and average characteristics across neighbors
Within neighborhood Super-neighborhood, without
neighborhood
unconditional cond. on
neighborhood
unconditional cond. on
neighborhood
female 0.4919 0.4920 0.4954 0.4955
male 0.5062 0.5060 0.5050 0.5048
Age 15-24 0.1153 0.1235 0.1101 0.1145
Age 25-34 0.2038 0.2071 0.1949 0.1953
Age 35-54 0.5288 0.5254 0.5266 0.5255
Age 55-65 0.1739 0.1764 0.1720 0.1730
Unskilled 0.1267 0.1340 0.1226 0.1244
Med. skilled 0.3958 0.3913 0.4024 0.4012
Highskilled 0.1182 0.1074 0.1104 0.1014
Unknown skill 0.2611 0.2684 0.2576 0.2618
German 0.8766 0.8731 0.8830 0.8817
Greek 0.0042 -0.0210 0.0062 -0.0229
Italian 0.0082 0.0188 0.0053 -0.0068
Spanish 0.0041 -0.0577 0.0024 -0.0373
Turkish 0.0623 0.1157 0.0481 0.0817
Yugoslaviana 0.0254 0.0626 0.0161 0.0257
From new EUa 0.0159 0.0787 0.0089 0.0336
Other national-
ity
0.0687 0.0933 0.0538 0.0706
Primary sector 0.0208 0.0177 0.0241 0.0200
Manufacturing 0.1372 0.1349 0.1352 0.1337
Construction 0.0288 0.0283 0.0288 0.0252
TTCb 0.2595 0.2612 0.2604 0.2619
Business Services 0.1672 0.1715 0.1687 0.1706
Other Services 0.2326 0.2287 0.2365 0.2346
a: Yugoslavian covers immigrants from the territory of former Yugoslavia (including
Slovenia and Croatia); these are not included in the group of immigrants from new
EU members (which come from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Malta and Cyprus).
b: Trade, Transportation and Communication (TTC).
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Table A.10: Estimation of Heterogenous Referral Effects, Full Out-
put
Refferal to neighborhood (a = n) Refferal to firm (a = f)
Variable (2) (3) (2) (3)
Constant 2.2207∗∗∗ 2.0837∗∗∗ .2347∗∗∗ -.1196
(.2998) (.3811) (.1063) (.1054)
Rij .1432
∗∗∗ .1237∗∗∗ .0784∗∗∗ .0605∗∗∗
(.0238) (.0185) (.0241) (.0182)
male -.4281∗∗∗ -.3378∗∗∗ .0266∗∗∗ .2031∗∗∗
(.0322) (.0204) (.0068) (.0094)
male x Rij -.0047 .0457
∗∗∗ -.0065 .0426∗∗∗
(.0205) (.0138) (.0152) (.0076)
Age 15-24 .1423∗∗∗ .4552∗∗∗ -.0300∗∗ .0173
(.0539) (.0550) (.0119) (.0125)
15-24 x Rij .0018 .0482 -.0030 .0738
∗∗∗
(.0298) (.0493) (.0176) (.0263)
Age 25-34 -.1018∗∗∗ -.1012∗∗∗ -.0204∗∗ .0513∗∗∗
(.0381) (.0371) (.0093) (.0161)
25-34 x Rij .0256 .0245 -.0030 .0072
(.0182) (.0264) (.0176) (.0183)
Age 55-65 .2559∗∗∗ .5401∗∗∗ .0471∗∗∗ .1673∗∗∗
(.0414) (.0379) (.0109) (.0119)
55-65 x Rij .0253 .0382 -.0268 .0203
(.0310) (.0344) (.0109) (.0213)
Unskilled .2130∗∗∗ .7077∗∗∗ .1592∗∗∗ .4913∗∗∗
(.0485) (.0436) (.0117) (.0232)
Uskill x Rij .0106 .1874
∗∗∗ .0136 .1640∗∗∗
(.0224) (.0389) (.0108) (.0283)
Medium Skilled .0335 .1684∗∗∗ .1085∗∗∗ .1859∗∗∗
(.0370) (:0195) (.0069) (.0064)
Mskill x Rij -.0206 .0199 .0122 .0353
∗∗∗
(.0193) (.0158) (.0127) (.0118)
Highskilled -.3452∗∗∗ -.1757∗∗ .0887∗∗∗ .3355∗∗∗
(.0656) (.0806) (.0310) (.0601)
Hskill x Rij .1225 .7734 .1639 .8573
(.1632) (.7215) (.1705) (.7615)
Greek .0714 .6593∗∗ .0544 .6890∗∗∗
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(.1938) (.3124) (.0442) (.1534)
Greek x Rij .2102
∗∗ 1.1252∗∗∗ .0544 .9341∗∗∗
(.0924) (.3955) (.0442) (.3205)
Italian .3245∗∗ .8777∗∗∗ .0388 .4942∗∗∗
(.1563) (.2147) (.0508) (.1168)
Italian x Rij .2061 1.3011
∗∗ .2183 .9314∗∗∗
(.2092) (.5590) (.2092) (.2962)
Spanish .4197 .2624 .0565 .5697∗
(.4024) (.5732) (.1050) (.3239)
Spanish x Rij -.1935 1.0928 .0036 .4120
(.1337) (1.0306) (.0508) .7877)
Turkish .1791∗∗ 1.0417∗∗∗ .1543∗∗∗ .9615∗∗∗
(.0793) (.1300) (.0247) (.0911)
Turkish x Rij .0355 .1888 .0392
∗∗ .1672∗∗
(.0404) (.1221) (.0160) (.0677)
Yugoslaviana .1747 .5328∗∗ .0206 .3085∗∗∗
(.1409) (.2055) (.0309) (.0728)
Yugo. x Rij .1214
∗ 1.0888∗∗∗ .0012 .6416∗∗∗
(.0665) (.2647) (.0189) (.1313)
From new EUa -.0339 1.3035∗ -.0571 .3241
(.1657) (.6390) (.0384) (.3214)
New EU x Rij .5642
∗ 23.8789∗∗∗ .4976 23.4559∗∗∗
(.3133) (5.5630) (.3144) (6.9550)
Primary Sector .1152∗ 6.1700∗∗∗ -.2440∗ 5.0837∗∗∗
(.0697) (.3083) (.0191) (.2351)
PSector x Rij -.0936
∗∗ 1.777∗∗∗ -.0268 1.8385∗∗∗
(.0373) (.3862) (.0373) (.3411)
Construction -.1783∗∗ .6681∗∗∗ -.3861∗∗ .4942∗∗∗
(.0593) (.0993) (.0181) (.1169)
Constr. x Rij -.0293 .7193
∗∗∗ -.0703∗∗ .1385∗∗∗
(.0364) (.1031) (.0215) (.0259)
TTCb .3323∗∗∗ .7939∗∗∗ -.3072∗∗∗ .4300∗∗∗
(.0434) (.0336) (.0173) (.0163)
TTC x Rij -.0493
∗ .2150∗∗∗ -.0661∗ .1827∗∗∗
(.0279) (.0356) (.0205) (.0321)
Buisness Ser-
vices
.3367∗∗∗ 1.1018∗∗∗ .3367∗∗∗ 1.1018∗∗∗
(.0530) (.0563) (.0530) (.0563)
Buisness x Rij -.0996
∗∗∗ .1754∗∗∗ -.0996∗∗∗ .1754∗∗∗
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(.0304) (.0404) (.0304) (.0404)
Other Service .6980∗∗∗ 1.7521∗∗∗ -.1078∗∗∗ .8796∗∗∗
(.0120) (.1761) (.0205) (.0307)
Services x Rij -.0171 .03045
∗ .0112 .3091∗
(.0622) (.1761) (.0613) (.1853)
coresize 32.5784 27.6795 -4.3344 -3.9490
(20.6601) (19.6010) (5.4710) (5.4285)
csize x Rij -.0822
∗∗∗ -.0882∗∗∗ -.0500∗∗∗ -.0571∗∗∗
(.0120) (.0124) (.0072) (.0083)
σu 36.6795 31.1610 5.1042 4.6731
σε 13.2821 13.2703 4.7623 4.7485
# pairs 179.7 Mio 179.7 Mio 179.7 Mio 179.7 Mio
# groups 10,159 10,159 10,159 10,159
Corr(u,Xb) -.0042 -.9996 .0249 -.9984
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark significance at the 90%/95%/99% confidence level.
a: Yugoslavian covers immigrants from the territory of former Yugoslavia (including Slovenia
and Croatia); these are not included in the group of immigrants from new EU members (which
come from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Romania, Malta and Cyprus).
b: Trade, Transportation and Communication (TTC).
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Figure A.3: Rhein-Ruhr Metropolitan Area
Figure A.4: Size distribution of neighborhoods and super-neighborhoods
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